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ARTICLES
ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION*
Michael F. Urbanski**
Francis H. Casola***
I. INTRODUCTION
Group boycott and antitrust conspiracy claims met with little
success in Virginia this year. Both federal and state courts are
increasingly wary of allowing cases to proceed where the essen-
tial elements of antitrust claims are not established or where
no impact on competition is proven. Moreover, procedural and
evidentiary difficulties have plagued antitrust plaintiffs this
* This article addresses federal and state legislative developments and
enforcement activities, and antitrust decisions of the United States Supreme Court, if
any, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and state and federal courts of
Virginia from June, 1994 to June, 1995.
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College of William and Mary; J.D., 1981, University of Virginia School of Law. Mr.
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Section of the Virginia State Bar and an Ex Officio member of that Section's Board
of Governors.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of M. Beth Frackleton, Uni-
versity of Virginia School of Law, J.D. Candidate, May, 1997, in the creation of this
article. The authors also acknowledge and appreciate the assistance of Frank Seales,
Jr., Chief, and Josh Lief, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust and Consumer Litiga-
tion Section, Commonwealth of Virginia, Office of Attorney General, for information
regarding Virginia state antitrust enforcement actions.
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year. In short, the cases reflect judicial analysis that is both
sophisticated and resistant to allowing meritless antitrust
claims to get to a jury.
II. CIVIL ANTITRUST ACTIONS
A. Statute of Limitations and the Fraudulent Concealment
Doctrine
Judge Jackson L. Kiser, Chief Judge of the Western District
of Virginia, rendered a significant decision this past year in two
related cases dealing with bid-rigging and price fixing when he
ruled that an antitrust plaintiff must present acts of conceal-
ment "separate and apart" from the underlying conspiracy be-
fore it may invoke the equitable doctrine of fraudulent conceal-
ment' to toll the statute of limitations. ' The cases, Supermar-
ket of Marlinton v. Meadow Gold Dairies3 and West Virginia ex.
rel McGraw v. Meadow Gold Dairies,4 although not consolidat-
ed, arose generally out of the same factual background. Both
cases were brought after Meadow Gold and Valley Rich Dairy
pled guilty in 1992 to one count informations charging viola-
tions of the Sherman Act5 for rigging bids to certain school
districts in parts of southwestern Virginia and southeastern
West Virginia in the mid-1980s.6 While the companies pled
guilty, three employees of Meadow Gold were indicted and
individually prosecuted. The government's principal evidence
against these three employees at trial was the testimony of
Paul French, the former General Manager of Valley Rich, who
1. To toll the statute of limitations on the basis of fraudulent concealment, a
plaintiff must show that '(1) the party pleading the statute fraudulently concealed
facts which are the basis of the claim, and that (2) the claimant failed to discover
those facts within the statutory period, despite (3) the exercise of due diligence."
Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211, 218 (4th Cir.
1987).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1994) provides that antitrust actions "shall be forever barred
unless commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued."
3. 874 F. Supp. 721 (W.D. Va. 1994).
4. 875 F. Supp. 340 (W.D. Va. 1994).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
6. The authors represented Valley Rich Dairy during the criminal investigation
and defended Valley Rich in both the Marlinton and McGraw cases. Since Judge
Kiser's decisions, the McGraw case has settled and Marlinton has been appealed to
the Fourth Circuit.
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testified under a grant of use immunity.! The trial, over which
Judge Kiser presided, resulted in a hung jury, and the govern-
ment subsequently abandoned its prosecution.'
Based on French's testimony, the State of West Virginia later
filed suit on behalf of three West Virginia school districts to
recover civil damages under the Sherman Act The Supermar-
ket of Marlinton, purporting to represent a class of commercial
customers, also filed suit against the dairies and their partners
for fixing prices to commercial customers in Virginia and West
Virginia.' Both suits were filed in 1993, well after the run-
ning of the four-year statute of limitations."
Recognizing this, each plaintiff pled that the equitable doc-
trine of fraudulent concealment tolled the limitations period.'
After discovery, the dairies moved for summary judgment on
the statute of limitations. In response, the plaintiffs in both
cases offered the criminal testimony of Paul French as their
principal evidence of fraudulent concealment. 3 They also of-
fered non-collusion affidavits submitted by the dairies to certain
schools,' 4 and the Supermarket of Marlinton offered the testi-
mony of a former Meadow Gold employee.'5
Judge Kiser was unimpressed, holding French's criminal
testimony inadmissible hearsay and ruling that plaintiffs' re-
maining evidence was insufficient under the applicable fraudu-
lent concealment standard.'6 The plaintiffs offered French's
testimony under three exceptions to the hearsay rule.' They
7. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 723; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 343.
8. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 723; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 343.
9. McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 343.
10. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 723.
11. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 723; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 343.
12. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 723; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 343.
13. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 725; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 344. During discov-
ery, Paul French's counsel indicated that he would assert his privilege against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment if he were asked to give a deposition. Both
plaintiffs moved to have him declared unavailable for purposes of admitting his testi-
mony under an exception to the hearsay rule. Without reaching the issue, Judge
Kiser assumed French's unavailability for purposes of his decision. Marlinton, 874 F.
Supp. at 725; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 344.
14. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 725; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 344.
15. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 723.
16. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 730; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 349.
17. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 725; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 344.
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claimed that it was admissible as former testimony under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1),"5 as a statement against inter-
est under Rule 804(b)(3), or under the residual exception found
in Rule 804(b)(5). 9
In considering the first exception, former testimony, and
whether the parties had similar motives in cross-examination,
Judge Kiser considered the fraudulent concealment doctrine and
explained that the circuits have adopted three different stan-
dards. The most lenient standard, known as the self-concealing
conspiracy doctrine, is set forth in the Second Circuit's opinion
in New York v. Hendrickson Bros.2" and does not require proof
of affirmative acts of concealment. On the other hand, the
Tenth Circuit requires proof of acts of concealment "separate
and apart" from the acts constituting the conspiracy itself.21
According to Judge Kiser, "[t]his standard requires 'affirmative
steps in addition to the original wrongdoing to prevent the
plaintiff from discovering the wrong.' Essentially, a post-fraud
cover up is required."' Under a third (intermediate) standard,
acts of concealment committed in furtherance of the underlying
conspiracy are sufficient."
18. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) provides for the admission of:
testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a differ-
ent proceeding... if the party against whom the testimony is now of-
fered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had
an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct,
cross, or redirect examination.
FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(1).
According to Judge Kiser, the focus of the inquiry under Rule 804(b)(1) is on
the similarity of motives between the predecessor in interest and the one against
whom the testimony is now offered. Marlinton, 874 F.Supp. at 725 (citing Home v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 4 F.3d 276, 282 (4th Cir. 1993)). "If the motives are
different, then the testimony is inadmissible." Id. "Tihe party against whom the
testimony is now offered must point up factual and legal distinctions not evident in
the earlier litigation that would preclude similar motives of witness examination." Id.
19. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 725; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 344.
20. 840 F.2d 1065 (2nd Cir. 1987).
21. Colorado v. Western Paving Constr. Co., 630 F. Supp. 206, 210 (D. Colo.
1986), affld by equally divided en banc court, 841 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir.) (withdrawing
prior panel opinion), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
22. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 724; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 343 (quoting West-
ern Paving, 630 F. Supp. at 210) (citations omitted).
23. Texas v. Allan Constr. Co., 851 F.2d 1526 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Pinney
Dock & Trans. Corp. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1471-72 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 880 (1988).
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The significance of this analysis for purposes of examining
the former testimony hearsay exception, in Judge Kiser's view,
was that if the self-concealing standard applied, the motives of
the criminal defendants and the civil corporate defendants on
cross-examination would be similar, i.e., proving no conspiracy
existed.'M But, if the Tenth Circuit standard applied, then the
motives would be different, because there would be no reason
for the prosecution and the defense to examine French on
whether he engaged in additional acts to cover up the alleged
conspiracy.'m
Judge Kiser easily disposed of the self-concealing standard
under the authority of Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp. in which the Fourth Circuit held that fraudu-
lent concealment "implies conduct ... affirmatively directed at
deflecting litigation."" He explained:
Pocahontas must mean that the defendant's acts must
amount to more than clandestine meetings between co-con-
spirators.... It would seem that the Pocahontas 'deflecting
litigation' standard would refer to situations where the
conspirators had some knowledge, or at least a suspicion,
that their misdeeds were about to be discovered and took
additional steps to cover up their activities. For example, if
the defendant acts to deflect litigation by shredding docu-
ments or issuing misleading or false press releases, the
equitable tolling doctrine comes into play.27
The court then considered whether acts "separate and apart"
or acts "in furtherance" would suffice. Judge Kiser decided that
the facts of Pocahontas compelled application of the "separate
and apart" standard because there the Fourth Circuit chose not
to examine the specific activities undertaken in the conspiracy
or the "manipulative and deceptive practices" associated with
the conspiracy alleged by the plaintiff.2"
24. In this regard, Judge Kiser noted that "[a]ny testimony regarding secrecy of
the meetings between French and the defendants would be only incidental to the fact
that meetings were held at all." Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 725; McGraw, 875 F.
Supp. at 345.
25. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 725; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 345.
26. 828 F.2d 211, 219 (4th Cir. 1987).
27. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 726; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 345.
28. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 726; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 346.
1995] 793
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Judge Kiser held that the "separate and apart" standard was
the better reasoned rule.29 He explained that as conspiracies,
by their very nature, involved acts of concealment, the "in fur-
therance" standard would make the fraudulent concealment
doctrine "potentially applicable in every conspiracy case," con-
trary to Congress' intent and to the policy behind the four-year
statute of limitations.0
Judge Kiser also criticized the "in furtherance" standard as
difficult to apply and dismissed the Allan Construction court's
criticism of the "separate and apart" standard as unworkable. 1
He noted that the Allan Construction court was not clear on
what acts were sufficient to meet its standard or how to distin-
guish between acts that are part of a conspiracy and acts that
are in furtherance of the conspiracy and are intended to conceal
it.
3 2
Because the court correctly held that fraudulent concealment
requires acts separate and apart from the conspiracy, Judge
Kiser held that the criminal and civil defendants did not have
similar motives on cross-examination.33 The criminal defen-
dants were only interested in developing French's testimony
concerning the conspiracy itself.' The defendants would have
undercut their defense if they inquired how French may have
concealed the conspiracy.35 Moreover, in Judge Kiser's words,
"tihere was certainly no motive to inquire into the subtle dis-
tinction between those acts taken in furtherance of the conspir-
acy and those acts that were taken separate and apart from the
conspiracy to cover it up."36 The former testimony exception to
the hearsay rule, therefore, was inapplicable.
Judge Kiser also held that French's testimony did not fall
under the statement against interest or the residual hearsay
exceptions." Thus, French's testimony was inadmissible.
29. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 726; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 346.
30. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 726; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 346.
31. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 726; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 346.
32. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 727; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 346.
33. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 727; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 346.
34. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 727; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 346.
35. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 727; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 346.
36. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 727; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 346.
37. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 728; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 347-49; see infra
[Vol. 29:789794
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Without French's testimony, the plaintiffs' remaining evidence
of fraudulent concealment was insufficient. In Marlinton, the
plaintiff sought refuge in alleged anecdotes which consisted of
nothing more than a request to shut an office door and an
observation that certain meetings should be held one-on-one. 8
Judge Kiser found nothing unusual about wanting to keep a
conversation private. He also held that shutting a door while
allegedly discussing the conspiracy was not an act "separate
and apart" from the conspiracy itself.39 As for the one-on-one
meetings comment, Judge Kiser considered it a mere observa-
tion.4 ° Most importantly, though, the comment did not indicate
a cover-up because the plaintiff's own evidence was that the
person making the comment was not involved in the alleged
conspiracy.
41
The plaintiffs also offered non-collusion statements contained
in the bids submitted by the defendants to schools. 4 Judge
Kiser ruled that the non-collusion statements did not meet the
separate and apart standard because they were "simply a fail-
ure to disclose wrongdoing and not an affirmative act of con-
cealment."'
B. Sherman Act Section 1 Conspiracy Issues
The Fourth Circuit issued one Sherman Act Section 1 opinion
this year, in which it held that an exclusive relationship be-
tween cable television companies and independent sales agents
("traditional cable reps") did not constitute a horizontal
conspiracy.4 In the one unpublished opinion issued by the
part H.F.2 (discussing this part of Judge Kiser's ruling).
38. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 729.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 729-30.
42. Id. at 730; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 349.
43. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 730; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 349 (both citing
Colorado v. Western Paving Constr. Co., 630 F. Supp. 206, 209-10 (D. Colo. 1986),
affd by equally divided en banc court, 841 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 870 (1988)); see also Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828
F.2d 211, 218-19 ('Traudulent concealment' implies conduct more affirmatively direct-
ed at deflecting litigation than [an alleged failure to own up to illegal conduct].").
44. Thompson Everett, Inc. v. National Cable Advertising, 57 F.3d 1317, 1324
(4th Cir. 1995).
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Fourth Circuit this year, the court easily disposed of a
plaintiffs claims under the intracorporate immunity doctrine.
The Eastern District of Virginia issued a published opinion
granting summary judgment in a case complicated by underly-
ing state court litigation. Finally, two separate courts, in rul-
ings from the bench, found no merit to plaintiffs' claims of
group boycott.
1. The Intracorporate Immunity Doctrine
In the unpublished Fourth Circuit opinion, Seabury Manage-
ment v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America,45 the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment as a matter of law
in favor of the defendants on plaintiffs Section 1 claims.4" The
plaintiff, Seabury Management, sued the Professional Golfers'
Association (PGA) and the Middle Atlantic Section of the PGA
(MAPGA) alleging restraint of trade under the Sherman Act '
and the Maryland Antitrust Act," as well as breach of con-
tract and tortious interference.49
Seabury's claims arose from a five-year contract between it
and MAPGA that allowed Seabury to produce and promote a
golf trade show on the East Coast under MAPGA sponsor-
ship.5° For the first several exhibitions, Seabury was unable to
lease sufficient exhibition space within MAPGA's boundaries, so
it held the trade show in Atlantic City, New Jersey, within the
boundaries of the Philadelphia Section of the PGA.5 The PGA
objected, ultimately refused to allow the trade shows to proceed,
and ordered MAPGA to withdraw its sponsorship, even though
45. No. 94-1814, 94-1688, 1995 WL 241379 (4th Cir. Apr. 26, 1995) (unpublished
disposition).
46. Id. at *3.
47. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1994).
48. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-204(a)(1990).
49. Seabury, 1995 WL 241379 at *2.
50. Id. at *1.
51. Id.
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it realized this would be a breach of MAPGA's contract with
Seabury 2
A jury returned a verdict for Seabury on all claims, awarding
$2.6 million in compensatory damages and $4.8 million in puni-
tive damages." The district court, however, granted PGA and
MAPGA judgment as a matter of law on all counts except the
breach of contract claim." The Fourth Circuit had little trou-
ble affhming the dismissal of Seabury's Section 1 claims on the
grounds that MAPGA and PGA were a single economic unit
unable to conspire with itself5' under the Supreme Court's
teaching in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.5"
and the Fourth Circuit's prior rulings in Oksanen v. Page Me-
morial Hospital" and Advanced Health-Care Services v.
Radford Community Hospital."
2. Concerted Action Held Lacking
In Thompson Everett v. National Cable Advertising,59 the
Fourth Circuit held that the action of independent cable reps in
enforcing their exclusive contracts with cable companies did not
amount to a horizontal antitrust conspiracy among the reps.
The court noted that there was no proof that the traditional
cable reps conspired to enter into the exclusive contracts and,
without more, there was insufficient evidence to draw the infer-
ence that concerted activity was the cause for the contractual
enforcement." The court further rejected the notion that infor-
mation disseminated by a cable television trade association that
the independent cable reps believed that cable could best com-
52. Id.
53. Id- at *2.
54. Id.
55. Id. at *3. The district court also granted judgment as a matter of law on
both the compensatory and punitive damages awards. Id. at *4-*6.
56. 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (holding that a corporation and its wholly owned subsid-
iary are not capable of conspiring in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.)
57. 945 F.2d 696, 703-05 (4th Cir. 1991) (en bane) (holding that a hospital and
its medical staff are incapable of conspiring during the peer review process), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1074 (1992).
58. 910 F.2d 139, 146 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding two wholly owned subsidiaries of
the same parent corporation legally incapable of conspiring).
59. 57 F.3d 1317 (4th Cir. 1995).
60. Id. at 1323-24.
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pete with other media by means of the exclusive contracts was
enough to establish concerted action, particularly when there
was no evidence that the reps engaged in any further concerted
activity following the circulation of this information.6
Judge Jackson, sitting on the District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, granted summary judgment on the
plaintiffs claims under Sherman Act Section 1 in Levine v.
McLeskey.62 Gail M. Levine and Marina Shores Ltd. brought
suit against F. Wayne McLeskey, Jr. alleging violations of the
Sherman and Virginia Antitrust Acts, and other state law caus-
es of action.63 McLeskey is the fifty percent owner of Cohn-
Phillips, Ltd., which leased space at the Marina Shores marina
for the operation of a restaurant, and the owner of Lynnhaven
Dry Storage Marina, Inc., a competitor of Marina Shores in the
dry storage market in Virginia Beach."
This antitrust action followed a tangled web of underlying
litigation which began on June 7, 1991, when Levine brought
an action for unlawful detainer against Cohn-Phillips for failure
to pay rent and, in response, Cohn-Phillips filed counterclaims
for breach of the lease, tortious interference with business ex-
pectancy, and violations of the Virginia Business Conspiracy
Act.65 On April 1, 1992, a jury found in favor of Cohn-Phillips
and awarded damages of approximately $513,000."6 To collect
the judgment, Cohn-Phillips subsequently filed suit against the
Levines personally, in order to pierce Marina Shores' corporate
veil, and filed a lis pendens on the Marina Shores property.67
Marina Shores followed that suit with a second unlawful de-
tainer action for failure to pay rent for the months of June,
July and August 1992.6" On September 17, 1993, the Virginia
Supreme Court overturned the trial court's verdict in the first
unlawful detainer action and awarded Marina Shores judgment
in its favor.69
61. Id. at 1324.
62. 881 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. Va. 1995).
63. Id. at 1035-36.
64. Id. at 1036-37.
65. Id. at 1037.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1038.
68. Id.
69. Id. While the Supreme Court's decision in the first unlawful detainer action
798 [Vol. 29:789
1995] ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION 799
In the antitrust action which followed, the plaintiffs claimed
that McLeskey violated Sherman Act Section 1 and its Virginia
Antitrust Act counterpart7 ° by conspiring with Cohn-Phillips to
unreasonably and unlawfully restrain Marina Shores' trade and
business through its improper operation of the restaurant and
sham litigation.7 With regard to operation of the restaurant,
the district court held that Marina Shores was collaterally es-
topped from relitigating this issue. 2
The district court also held that McLeskey's lawsuits and
counterclaims did not constitute sham litigation under Profes-
sional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industries.73
Judge Jackson noted that in order for a lawsuit to be a sham,
it must be objectively baseless, and even if it is, the defendant's
subjective motivation in bringing the litigation must be to inter-
fere directly with the business relationship of a competitor.'
Because McLeskey won at the trial court level in the actions
complained of, Judge Jackson concluded that the litigation was
not objectively baseless. 5
In light of the above rulings, Judge Jackson found that there
was no basis for plaintiffs Sherman Act Section 1 and Virginia
Antitrust Acte6  claims of concerted action, and granted
was pending, Cohn-Phillips paid its rent monies into an escrow account which, at the
time of the Supreme Court's decision, totalled approximately $100,000. After the Su-
preme Court's decision, Marina Shoes demanded that Cohn-Phillips hand over the
monies from the escrow account, and Cohn-Phillips refused. Marina Shoes then
brought a detinue action against Cohn-Phillips which was dismissed on demurrer.
Subsequently, in a declaratory judgment action field by Cohn-Phillips, the Virginia
Beach Circuit Court held that Marina Shoes was entitled to the escrowed funds. Id.
at 1038-39.
70. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-9.1 to -9.16 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
71. Levine, 881 F. Supp. at 1041-42.
72. Id. at 1041. In the first unlawful detainer case, the jury was asked to deter-
mine whether Cohn-Phillips breached the lease through the negligent operation of its
restaurant. The jury answered "no" to this instruction. Thus, the district court held
that the issue of McLeskey's operation of the restaurant previously had been raised
and decided. Id.
73. 113 S. Ct. 1920, 1926 (1993) (holding that "an objectively reasonable effort to
litigate cannot be a sham regardless of subjective intent").
74. Levine, 881 F. Supp. at 1042.
75. Id. at 1042-44.
76. The court analyzed the Virginia Antitrust Act claims under federal case law
as well as in light of the General Assembly's mandate that the state's antitrust laws
"shall be applied and construed to effectuate [their] general purposes in harmony with
judicial interpretation of comparable federal statutory provisions." Id.; VA. CODE ANN.
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McLeskey summary judgment." The court dismissed Marina
Shores' Section 1 claims on this ground.5 With respect to
Levine's Section 2 claims, the court additionally held that they
were deficient because Levine failed to provide any evidence of
a relevant market as to her. Levine claimed she had been re-
strained in her efforts to develop real estate, but she neither
defined this as a relevant market nor demonstrated that
McLeskey wielded market power in any real estate market. 9
The report of Levine's expert only focused on the product and
geographic markets for marina services."0
3. Group Boycott Claims Dismissed on Summary Judgment
In two alleged group boycott cases, courts in western Virginia
granted summary judgment for the defendants in bench rulings
issued after extensive discovery.
In Worrell Enterprises v. Real Estate III, 1 U.S. Magistrate
Judge B. Waugh Crigler, sitting by consent of the parties,
granted summary judgment to the defendant real estate bro-
kerage firms in Charlottesville in a case brought by Worrell
Enterprises, the publisher of The Daily Progress newspaper,
alleging a group boycott of real estate advertising.
Worrell sued Real Estate III and several other real estate
brokerage firms in Charlottesville claiming that they engaged in
a conspiracy to boycott Worrell's newspaper, The Daily Progress
(the Progress), in violation of Sherman Act Section 1.82 Worrell
also alleged violations of Virginia's business conspiracy statute
and tortious interference with business expectancies.' Worrell
brought suit after the real estate firms allegedly withdrew a
substantial portion of their real estate advertising from the
Progress and placed it in a new publication, The Real Estate
§ 59.1-9.17 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
77. Levine, 881 F. Supp. at 1046.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1046-47.
80. Id. at 1047.
81. No. 94-0001-C (W.D. Va. Dec. 13, 1994) (unpublished transcript, on file with
the University of Richmond Law Review). The authors were counsel for one of the
defendant real estate firms in this case.
82. Id. at 157.
83. Id.
800 [Vol. 29:789
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Weekly (the Weekly), which had been formed by the
Charlottesville Area Association of Realtors.' The defendants
counterclaimed, alleging that Worrell had filed a sham suit in
violation of Sherman Act Section 2 to monopolize and attempt
to monopolize the print residential real estate advertising
market.'
After extensive discovery, both sides filed cross motions for
summary judgment. 6 Magistrate Judge Crigler, who presided
over the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73
and 28 U.S.C. § 636, granted both motions from the bench.87
With respect to Worrell's claims, Judge Crigler held as a
threshold matter that since Worrell was neither a consumer nor
competitor in the real estate brokerage market, which Worrell
identified as the relevant market, Worrell had no standing to
bring its claim.' Judge Crigler noted that Worrell had to iden-
tify an injury to the advertising market to have standing.89
Judge Crigler also agreed with the defendants' remaining
arguments. He refused to adopt Worrell's assertion that the
defendants' "boycott" was a per se violation, holding instead
that the alleged conspiracy was to be analyzed under the rule
of reason." Judge Crigler drew this conclusion because the
record contained substantial evidence that the challenged
conduct fostered competition, increased efficiency, "filled a gap
in real estate advertising that did not exist before the Weekly,"
and was supported by ample competitive justification.9' For
example, the evidence offered by experts for both sides showed
that, after introduction of the Weekly, the amount of advertising
in the market increased and advertising rates decreased." The
per se rule also was inapplicable because the defendants had
not foreclosed plaintiff from competing in the advertising
market." Moreover, Judge Crigler held that Worrell's claim
84. Id
85. Id at 159.
86. Id. at 157.
87. Id. at 156.
88. Id at 168.
89. Id at 169.
90. Id. at 176.
91. Id. at 174.
92. Id.
93. Id
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failed under either a "quick look" or full blown rule of reason
analysis.94
On the issue of conspiracy, Judge Crigler also ruled that
Worrell had not presented evidence showing a conscious com-
mitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful
objective." The evidence of conspiracy on which Worrell relied
was piecemeal and taken out of context. In any event, Worrell
did not come forward with significant evidence tending to ex-
clude the possibility of independent action as required by the
Supreme Court in Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.9" and
Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.97
Judge Crigler noted that the defendants' legitimate business
purposes were "legion," that Worrell had no evidence to rebut
them, and that its evidence of "sinister purpose" was merely
opinion, conclusion or argument, and not based upon facts.98
Under such circumstances, no factfinder could find that the
"conspiracy" was designed to achieve an unlawful objective.
Judge Crigler dismissed Worrell's state law conspiracy claim
because Worrell could not show that the defendants' motive in
leaving the Progress was inspired by hatred or ill will toward
Worrell.99 He also dismissed the tortious interference claim
because Worrell could not demonstrate "improper means."""
Judge Crigler also granted Worrell's motion for summary
judgment on the counterclaim.1"' He ruled as a matter of law
that Worrell's suit was not a sham, because at the time it filed
suit Worrell had probable cause in that it had a reasonable
argument for extension of the law. °2 Judge Crigler also ruled
that the defendants had not otherwise come forward with evi-
dence of predatory conduct. 3
In Tempkin v. Lewis-Gale Clinic,'04 a health care antitrust
94. Id. at 183.
95. Id. at 185.
96. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
97. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
98. Worrell Enterprises, supra note 77, at 183.
99. Id. at 187.
100. Id. at 188.
101. Id. at 189.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 190.
104. No. 89-209 (Salem City July 6, 1995) (unpublished transcript, on file with the
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case which previously had been dismissed by the United States
District Court for the Western District of Virginia and the
Fourth Circuit,"5 the Circuit Court for the City of Salem like-
wise granted summary judgment in a case brought under the
Virginia Antitrust Act."0 6 In Tempkin, the plaintiff physiatrist
alleged a per se group boycott by members of the Lewis-Gale
Clinic regarding new inpatient referrals for the Rehabilitation
Unit at the Lewis-Gale Hospital. After extensive discovery,
including many Rule 4:11 admissions by the plaintiff, Judge
G.O. Clemens granted the defendants summary judgment, rul-
ing that because the alleged boycott was not between competi-
tors, it was not subject to the per se rule. 7 There being no
dispute that the plaintiff retained privileges at Lewis-Gale Hos-
pital, that other rehabilitation facilities were present in the
market and that the alleged violations had no impact on price
or quality, the court had little difficulty finding no antitrust
violation under the rule of reason.' The court also rejected
the claimed tying violation, drawing on the wealth of case law
finding no antitrust violation in the hospital exclusive contract
arena."° The court also rejected claims based on the Virginia
business conspiracy statute and tortious interference with con-
tract, ruling that once the antitrust claims were dismissed,
there was no evidence of unlawful conduct or improper means
sufficient to give rise to the state law claims."0 Adopting the
reasoning of the prior federal court opinions, Judge Clemens
also dismissed the case for lack of antitrust injury and stand-
ing."' In sum, consistent with many prior health care anti-
trust cases decided in the federal courts of Virginia and the
Fourth Circuit," the court determined that the plaintiff could
University of Richmond Law Review). The authors served as counsel for one of the
co-defendants.
105. Tempkin v. Lewis-Gale Hospital, No. 88-0156-R (W.D. Va. Nov. 22, 1989),
affd, No. 80-2504 (4th Cir. Apr. 19, 1991) (per curiam).
106. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-9.1 to -9.17 (1992).
107. Tempkin, supra note 104, at 9.
108. Id. at 9-10.
109. Id. at 10.
110. Id. at 10-11.
111. Id. at 11-12.
112. See, e.g., Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1074 (1992); White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820 F.2d 98
(4th Cir. 1987); Advanced Health-Care Serv. v. Giles Memorial Hosp., 846 F. Supp.
488 (W.D. Va. 1994); Cogan v. Steuer and Latham v. National Medical Enter., 672 F.
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not prove an antitrust violation and termed the case "an em-
ployment dispute.""3
C. Sherman Act Section 2 Monopolization Issues
After affirming the district court's finding of no concerted
action, the Fourth Circuit in Thomas Everett also rejected
plaintiffs claim that each individual exclusive representation
contract illegally denied Thompson Everett the opportunity to
compete."4 Following Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc.,".5 the court first held that the exclusive sales rep con-
tracts, as non-price vertical restraints, did not go beyond the
legitimate business purposes for which they were used. The
court found that the exclusive sales contracts were typically of
short duration, were competitively negotiated, and were advan-
tageous to the cable companies in their efforts to compete with
other media to attract advertising dollars. The court concluded
that "[wihile the exclusive nature of these cable rep contracts
may temporarily preempt competition in providing representa-
tion services to a particular cable company, Thompson Everett
has failed to establish that this relatively minor restriction out-
weighs the benefits oft increased 'inter-media' competition in
the larger market for advertising dollars."". The Fourth Cir-
cuit also rejected Thompson Everett's monopoly leveraging
claim, reasoning that "the absence of any evidence of monopoly
power, such as price control or monopoly profits, or threatened
monopoly power""' 7 in any market defined by the plaintiff was
"[f]atal to Thompson Everett's monopolization claim."m
The Fourth Circuit in Seabury Management v. Professional
Golfers' Ass'n of America" and the district court in Levine v.
Supp. 1489 (D. S.C. 1987), affd, 846 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988).
113. Tempkin, supra note 104, at 7.
114. Thompson Everett, 57 F.3d at 1325-26.
115. 433 U.S. 36, 54-57 (1977).
116. Thompson Everett, 57 F.3d at 1326 (citing Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville
Coal Co., 365 U.S. 3230, 333-35 (1961)); Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Radford
Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 151 (4th Cir. 1990).
117. Thompson Everett, 57 F.3d at 1326-27.
118. Id. at 1327.
119. Seabury Management v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America, Nos. 94-1814,
94-1688, 1995 WL 241379 (4th Cir. Apr. 20, 1995) (unpublished disposition).
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McLeskey" ° also disposed of plaintiffs Sherman Act Section
22 claims. The Fourth Circuit also issued a short per curiam
opinion in Giben America, Inc. v. Schelling America, Inc.,'
affirming the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs
meritless Section 2 claim. Further, in the Worrell' and
Tempkin' cases, the trial courts disposed of alleged monopo-
lization claims in the context of sham litigation and tying, re-
spectively.
In Giben, Giben America, a foreign corporation which designs
and manufacturers high tech panel saws, brought a Section 2
claim of attempted monopolization' against Schelling Ameri-
ca, a direct competitor of Giben in the North American market.
Giben filed the suit after an employee of Schelling mistakenly
advised a customer of Giben that Giben's panel saw violated
Schelling's patent in the United States and that the matter was
currently being litigated. " 6 Even though the Schelling em-
ployee corrected the error after discovering his mistake, and the
Giben customer purchased the saw as planned without any
profit loss to Giben,' Giben sued alleging that Schelling's
conduct had damaged its reputation and claiming that the cus-
tomer no longer trusted Giben and was less likely to deal with
it in the future.'
120. 881 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. Va. 1995).
121. Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to "monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade of commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations."
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
122. No. 94-1939, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 4789, (4th Cir. Mar. 10, 1995) (per curi-
am) (unpublished disposition).
123. Worrell Enterprises v. Real Estate 1H, No. 94-0001-C (W.D. Va. Dec. 13,
1994) (unpublished transcript, on file with the University of Richmond Law Review).
124. Tempkin v. Lewis-Gale Clinic, No. 89-209 (Salem City, July 6, 1995) (unpub-
lished transcript, on file with the University of Richmond Law Review).
125. It is generally required that to demonstrate the offense of attempted monopo-
lization a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or
anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous
probability of achieving monopoly power. See 3 PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW T 820 (1978); see also Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct.
884, 890-91 (1993); Abcor Corp. v. AM Intl, Inc., 916 F.2d 924, 926 (4th Cir. 1990);
Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 147 (4th
Cir. 1990).
126. Giben America, Inc., 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 4789, at *1.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *2.
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The district court, however, was not impressed and dismissed
all of Giben's claims, either on summary judgment or on a
motion to dismiss. 9 The district court dismissed the attempt-
ed monopolization claim because Giben failed to allege a causal
antitrust injury or a dangerous probability that Schelling's con-
duct would create a monopoly.3 0 The Fourth Circuit affimed
on the reasoning of the district court.
In Seabury Management v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of
America,'' the Fourth Circuit also found no merit in
Seabury's monopolization claim, ruling that Seabury failed to
define a relevant market. 32 While the court agreed that there
was sufficient evidence to support Seabury's claim that the rel-
evant market consisted of golf trade shows as a unique market-
ing technique, as opposed to other methods of marketing golf
equipment and merchandise, the court held that Seabury failed
to present evidence that the market was geographically limited
to the East Coast." Because nationally there were a "sub-
stantial" number of golf trade shows, and because the opinion
of Seabury's expert that the market did not include smaller golf
trade shows was not supported by the evidence, Seabury failed
to prove the existence of a relevant market." As "proof of a
relevant market is a threshold requirement of any Section 2
claim,"" the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant
of judgment as a matter of law.
The Eastern District was equally unpersuaded that the Sec-
tion 2 claim brought by Marina Shores in Levine v.
McLeskey"5. was supported by sufficient evidence to prove mo-
nopolization and attempted monopolization by McLeskey. Ma-
rina Shores argued that McLeskey monopolized or attempted to
monopolize the market for dry storage slips in the Lynnhaven
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Nos. 94-1814, 94-1688, 1995 WL 241379 (4th Cir. Apr. 26, 1995) (unpublished
disposition).
132. Id.
133. Id. at *3.
134. Id. at *4.
135. Id. (quoting Consul, Ltd. v. Transco Energy Co., 805 F.2d 490, 493 (4th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1050 (1987)).
136. 881 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. Va. 1995).
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Inlet market area. 37 Its market share evidence demonstrated
that McLeskey's Lynnhaven Marina had 55.7 percent of the dry
slip capacity in that market, but Marina Shores itself had 42.6
percent.'38 The parties enjoyed equally high market shares in
other defined local markets as well.'39 Judge Jackson was not
convinced that even a fifty-five percent market share was suffi-
cient to demonstrate prima facie monopoly power." Finding
the facts akin to those in Brager & Co., Inc. v. Leumi Securities
Corp.,14 ' he held that Marina Shores' monopolization claim
failed, given that Marina Shores controlled almost half of the
relevant market itself.'
Marina Shores' attempted monopolization claim also failed, as
it was based on McLeskey's negligent operation of the restau-
rant and sham litigation, which Judge Jackson had rejected
under its Section 1 analysis.' Moreover, Judge Jackson held
that because the parties almost evenly split the market, Marina
Shores failed to show that McLeskey had a dangerous probabili-
ty of achieving monopoly power. The court refused to speculate
about the market if McLeskey someday purchases Marina
Shores and its share of the market.'
D. Price Discrimination
In Bristol Steel & Iron Works v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,'
the Fourth Circuit affirmed a verdict which held that Bethle-
hem Steel's discounting of prices was justified under the Robin-
son-Patman Act's "meeting competition" affirmative defense.'
Bristol, a steel fabricator, alleged that Bethlehem discriminated
137. Id. at 1037-38.
138. Id. at 1047.
139. Id. For example, in the Lynnhaven/Rudee Inlet market area, Lynnhaven Mari-
na had 55.7% of the dry slips and Marina Shores had 42.6% In the Lynnhaven/Rudee
Inlet/Little Creek market area, Lynnhaven Marina had 41.5% of the dry slips and
Marina Shores had 31.8% of the dry slips. Id.
140. Id
141. 429 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
142. Levine, 881 F. Supp. at 1047.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 41 F.3d 182 (4th Cir. 1994). The authors were counsel for Bethlehem in this
case before the trial court and on appeal.
146. Id.
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in the price it charged Bristol for certain steel plates and
shapes.47 Bristol's claim centered on alleged price discounts
and unjustified rebates given by Bethlehem to certain indepen-
dent fabricators which were competitors of Bristol.'
The jury found for Bethlehem, and Bristol appealed.' On
appeal, Bristol raised the following contentions: (1) Bethlehem
failed to establish its affirmative defense by a preponderance of
the evidence; and the district court erred in (2) permitting un-
identified witnesses to testify; (3) in not submitting to the jury
during its deliberations invoices which formed the basis for
summary charts Bristol put into evidence; and (4) in instructing
the jury on a special verdict form to proceed with deliberations
concerning other issues on the form despite being deadlocked on
one question.5 ' The Fourth Circuit found no merit in Bristol's
arguments and affirmed.
First, the court ruled that it was foreclosed from considering
Bristol's sufficiency of the evidence claim, because Bristol had
never moved the district court for judgment as a matter of law
under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at the
end of Bethlehem's case.'5' "[A] party's complete failure to
move for judgment as a matter of law, barring plain error,
generally forecloses appellate review of the sufficiency of the
evidence." 5' The Court also rejected Bristol's argument that a
Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law, as to an affir-
mative defense, was not available to a plaintiff until after the
Rule was amended in 1993, noting that the Notes of the Advi-
sory Committee suggested otherwise. 53
In light of these rulings, the court determined that its scope
of review was therefore "limited to whether there was any evi-
dence to support the jury's verdict, irrespective of its sufficien-
cy, or whether plain error was committed which... would
result in a 'manifest miscarriage of justice.'"' The court
147. Id. at 184.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 186.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 187.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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found, though, that there was testimony that Bethlehem only
deviated from its price list in a good faith effort to meet compe-
tition in the relevant market.'55 Thus, the court concluded
that the jury's findings were clearly supported by the evi-
dence.156
The court also was unpersuaded by Bristol's contention that
the district court committed reversible error in allowing uniden-
tified witnesses to testify for Bethlehem.57 The court deferred
to the district court's discretion in allowing the witnesses to
testify because Bristol never sought a witness list by court
order or discovery, and no Rule 16 pretrial order was ever en-
tered in the case.'58 The court found Bristol's argument that
the witnesses should have been excluded irrelevant because
Bethlehem never mentioned them during voir dire, noting that
voir dire does "not operat[e] as a discovery tool by opposing
counsel."5 9
The Fourth Circuit also rejected Bristol's other claims. On
the third claim, the admissibility of invoices forming the basis
for summary charts, the Fourth Circuit held Bristol was not
entitled to have the invoices shown to the jury under Federal
Rule of Evidence 1006 because they were not in evidence. 6 '
On its final claim, Bristol complained that the district court "co-
erced" the jury's defense verdict when it instructed the jury
during deliberations, after it indicated a deadlock, that it
should consider other parts of the special verdict form, such as
the affirmative defense question, because they may be disposi-
tive of the case.' 6 ' The court, noting that it is the trial judge's
duty to be responsive to the jury's difficulties, found that the
district court's instruction did not "coerce" the jury but indeed
aided it.'
155. Id-
156. Id.
157. Id. at 188.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 189.
160. Id. at 189-90. This issue is treated in more detail, infra notes 182-191 and
accompanying text.
161. Id. at 190.
162. Id.
1995] 809
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
E. Antitrust Injury and Standing
In Thompson Everett, the Fourth Circuit found that the only
barriers to plaintiffs representation of cable companies were
the enforceable provisions of the exclusion rep contracts nd
Thompson Everett's self-selected position in the market as a
representative of advertisers, and concluded that "[s]ince nei-
ther of these barriers are created by anything illegal under the
antitrust laws, Thompson Everett has no basis for asserting an
antitrust claim."" The court further held that Thompson
Everett had shown no damage to the competition process re-
quired by Section 4 of the Clayton Act,' reasoning, "Thomp-
son Everett is not a would-be competitor with the cable reps
and is not being denied access to the cable company sales ser-
vice market by any act in violation of the antitrust laws. Rath-
er, Thompson Everett is simply seeking to substitute its pro-
posed method of serving cable companies for that selected by
the cable companies without demonstrating that the substitu-
tion would advance the competitive process."'"
Also, in both the Worrell and Tempkin bench rulings, the
courts rejected the alleged group boycott claims, because of the
absence of any antitrust injury and standing. In each case, the
courts' rulings were squarely in accord with the Supreme
Court's opinion in Associated General Contractors v. California
State Council of Carpenters,'66 because neither plaintiff was a
competitor or consumer in the relevant market, and neither
could demonstrate any injury to competition.
Similarly, in Levine, because Levine was neither a competitor
nor consumer in the market for marina services, and because
she failed to meet the other factors set out in Associated Gener-
al Contractors, the court held that she lacked standing to bring
her claims. 6 '
163. Thompson Everett v. Nat'l Cable Advertising, 57 F.3d 1317, 1325 (4th Cir.
1995).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
165. Thompson Everett, 57 F.3d at 1325 (citations omitted).
166. 459 U.S. 519, 539 (1983) (analyzing standing under six factors which examine
the nature of the alleged antitrust activity and the nature of the injury allegedly sus-
tained).
167. Levine v. McLeskey, 881 F. Supp. 1030, 1045-46 (E.D. Va. 1995).
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F. Procedure and Evidence
1. Procedure-Discovery and the Collateral Order Doctrine
In MDK, Inc. v. Mike's Train House,'68 the Fourth Circuit
refused to apply the exception of the collateral order doctrine to
a nonfinal discovery order in an antitrust case, but instead
followed established precedent by declining jurisdiction to re-
view a district court order compelling discovery of nonparties in
the underlying litigation.'69
In the underlying antitrust litigation, Mike's Train House
alleged that Lionel Trains violated Sherman Act Section 2 by
misusing its monopoly power in the market for 0 gauge model
trains. ° At issue was the relevant market definition for the
sale of 0 gauge model trains.' To marshal evidence proving
that Lionel monopolized that market, Mike's issued subpoenas
to other model train manufacturers, including MDK, requesting
business records detailing sales revenue and costs of goods
sold.' 2 MDK moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the
information sought constituted confidential commercial informa-
tion and trade secrets. 73 The magistrate judge held that be-
cause Mike's had a critical need for the information to deter-
mine the relevant market and the presence of monopoly power,
MDK must comply with the subpoena.'74 The district court
upheld this ruling, and MDK appealed.'75
The Fourth Circuit held that it had no jurisdiction to enter-
tain MDK's appeal of a nonfinal order. In doing so, the court
rejected MDKs contention that orders mandating discovery of
trade secrets are appealable. 6 The court also rejected MDK's
contention that the district court's order constituted a collateral
order under the doctrine established in Cohen v. Beneficial
168. 27 F.3d 116 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 510 (1994).
169. Id. at 121.
170. See Mike's Train House v. Lionel Trains, No. CA 93-60138 (E.D. Mich.).
171. MDK Inc., 27 F.3d at 118.
172. Id.
173. Id
174. Id. at 119.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 120.
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Industrial Loan Corp.177 Under Cohen, a court has jurisdiction
to review an appeal (1) if the party is unable to receive review
in another forum or (2) if the appeal could be considered apart
from the main issue being litigated. 7" The first exception did
not apply because MDK had another forum for appealing the
claim.'79 The second exception did not apply because the issue
on appeal could not be considered apart from the course of the
main litigation. Resolution of the issue, and any delay in doing
so, would directly impact the litigation.80 Thus, MDK could
not invoke the collateral order doctrine.''
2. Evidence
Two evidentiary issues in antitrust cases were decided by the
courts in the Fourth Circuit this past year. In Bristol Steel &
Iron Works v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,'82 the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's refusal to allow Bristol's evidence of
invoices to be submitted to the jury." Apparently pursuant to
Rule 1006, 1" Bristol had prepared charts summarizing invoic-
es and offered the charts in evidence to prove its price discrim-
ination claims.'85  But Bristol did not offer the actual
177. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The collateral order doctrine allows for a limited group
of "collateral" decisions to undergo review even where the decision does not have a
direct part in concluding the litigation in question. Generally, appellate review is
limited to decisions which have a bearing on concluding the litigation on the merits.
Id. at 546.
178. MDK, Inc., 27 F.3d at 120.
179. The Court noted that MDKs other option was to refuse to answer the order,
be cited for contempt, then challenge the order at the same time MDK appeals the
contempt citation. Id. at 121.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 122.
182. 41 F.3d 182 (4th Cir. 1994).
183. Id. at 189.
184. Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 provides that:
The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which
cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form
of a chart, summary or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be
made available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at
reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be produced in
court.
FFD. R. EvD. 1006.
185. Bristol Steel, 41 F.3d at 184.
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invoices.186 During deliberations the jury sent the court a note
stating: "We are deadlocked on [special verdict form interroga-
tory] #3. What is the proof required to establish a sale? [D]o we
need two invoices?"87 Bristol argued strenuously that the trial
court should provide the actual invoices to the jury since the
charts that were submitted as evidence were based on the con-
tents of the invoices." The district court, however, re-
fused.9
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, noting that the jury never spe-
cifically asked for the invoices but only queried what proof was
required to establish a sale." ° In any event, the court held
that because Bristol chose not to put the invoices in evidence
even though they were available, Bristol was not entitled to
have them shown to the jury under Rule 1006." 1
Judge Kiser's interesting ruling that a witness' prior criminal
testimony was inadmissible hearsay in a subsequent civil case
came in Supermarket of Marlinton v. Meadow Gold Dairies 2
and its companion case, State of West Virginia ex. rel McGraw
v. Meadow Gold Dairies.'93 In those cases, which are dis-
cussed in detail at the beginning of this article, the civil plain-
tiffs offered as evidence of fraudulent concealment the previous
testimony given in a criminal bid-rigging trial of three Meadow
Gold employees of a now unavailable witness, Paul French. The
plaintiffs argued that the prior testimony should come in under
one of the following exceptions to the hearsay rule: (1) former
testimony under Rule 804(b)(1); (2) statement against interest
under Rule 804(b)(3); or (3) Rule 804(b)(5)'s residual exception.
Judge Kiser was unconvinced, holding all these exceptions inap-
plicable.
As explained above Judge Kiser held that the testimony was
inadmissible under the former testimony exception because the
criminal defendants did not have the same motives in cross-
186. Id at 184-85.
187. Id at 185.
188. I&
189. Id.
190. Id at 189.
191. Id at 190.
192. 874 F. Supp. 721 (W.D. Va. 1994).
193. 875 F. Supp. 340 (W.D. Va. 1994).
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examining French on the fraudulent concealment issues as the
subsequent civil defendants.14  In drawing this conclusion,
Judge Kiser held that a plaintiff must demonstrate acts of
concealment "separate and apart" from the conspiracy itself. 5
Judge Kiser also did not allow admission of the testimony
under Rule 804(b)(3) 96 as a statement against interest be-
cause French had been immunized when he testified. In a com-
mon sense approach, Judge Kiser noted that "[a] reasonable
person in French's position would have testified to avoid crimi-
nal prosecution because that testimony would not be 'so far
contrary to [French's] pecuniary or proprietary interest ...
because his "testimony was for his interest, not against."'97 It
was not important to the court that French's testimony subject-
ed him to a theoretical but unrealistic possibility of civil lia-
bility.19
8
French's testimony also was inadmissible under the residual
exception found in Rule 804 (b)(5)99 because it did not have
"equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness" comparable to other
enumerated hearsay exceptions. Judge Kiser compared the
instant cases to that in United States v. Clarke,"0 where the
194. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 727; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 346-47.
195. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 727; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 346-47.
196. A statement falls under F.R.E. 804(b)(3)'s statement against interest exception
when it is:
at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary
interest or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant
to civil or criminal liability ... that a reasonable person in the
declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing
it to be true.
FED. R. EvID. 804.
197. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 728; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 347 (both quoting
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)) (alteration in original).
198. Id.
199. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) provides in pertinent part:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing excep-
tions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,
if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which
it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules
and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence.
FED. R. EVID 804.
200. 2 F.3d 81 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1194 (1994).
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Fourth Circuit allowed the immunized suppression hearing
testimony of the brother of the defendant charged in a drug
conspiracy to be admitted at trial when the brother refused to
testify.2"' The Fourth Circuit allowed the testimony in Clarke
because of its "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,"
and its "ring of reliability."02
While Judge Kiser found that Clarke held some comparisons
to the instant cases, such as the testimony in both cases was
immunized, under oath and subject to cross-examination, he
found the differences to be more compelling, even suggesting
that French had a motive to lie. °3 Unlike Clarke where the
witness had no reason to implicate his brother, French had the
obvious reason of self-preservation. He also had been fired by
Meadow Gold, giving rise to the additional motive of revenge,
and had made inconsistent statements to the government.2
But most compelling, in Judge Kiser's view, was that the jury
had refused to believe French and convict the criminal defen-
dants on his testimony.2 5 For these reasons, French's testimo-
ny did not possess the requisite "ring of reliability" for it to
come in under the residual exception.0 '
III. FEDERAL REGULATORY, ADMINISTRATIVE AND
ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
A. Antitrust Division Focuses on Civil Investigations
In February, 1995, the U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust
Division released its workload statistics from FY 1985 to FY
1994.0' Those statistics reflect the Antitrust Division's stated
interest in expanding its civil enforcement. Among the most
notable developments were increases in the Division's issuance
of civil investigative demands (CIDs),08 increases in negotia-
201. Id. at 83.
202. Id. at 84.
203. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 729; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 349.
204. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 729; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 349.
205. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 729; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 349.
206. Marlinton, 874 F. Supp. at 729; McGraw, 875 F. Supp. at 349.
207. Workload Statistics for Division Show Increase in CIDs, Advice to Foreign
States, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 68, at 129 (Feb. 2, 1995).
208. Id.
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tions with foreign entities, and a decrease in criminal enforce-
ment activities. 2
9
The total number of CIDs issued in FY 1994 was up 245
percent to 1,135, the highest number issued in one single
year.21 Compare that with fifty-seven criminal cases filed in
FY 1994, the third lowest number since 1985.211 The highest
number of criminal cases occurred in 1987 when ninety-two
cases were filed.21  Under the Clinton Administration in FY
1994, the Department of Justice also participated in the highest
number of representations and negotiations with international
organizations and governments, reflecting a national interest in
worldwide expansion of domestic products and services.2
That fiscal year also included other significant high numbers,
including the highest number of premerger notification cases
filed,214 the highest number of preliminary inquiries initiated
by the Division,215 and the highest number of civil cases filed
in district courts.216
Regarding investigations initiated under the Sherman Act,
the total number of actions taken under Section 1 for FY 1994
was 136, up from 109 in 1993.217 The total number for Section
2 was twenty-two, the highest since 1985.21" The total number
of investigations initiated under Section 7 of the Clayton Act
remained the same for FY 1993 and FY 1994 at 102 each year,
which was up from eight-four in FY 1992.219
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 130.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. In 1994, nine such cases were filed with the next highest being six fied in
1990 and 1988. Id. at 129.
215. This number was 254, compared to 185 in FY 1993. Id.
216. This number was 21, up from nine in FY 1993. Id.
217. The highest number of these investigations occurred in 1986 when 137 were
initiated. Id.
218. Id. at 146.
219. The highest number of these investigations occurred in 1987 with 109. Id
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B. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations
In April, 1995, the Justice Department and the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) issued the third version of the Anti-
trust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations.2
According to U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Diane P.
Wood, "international cooperation" is a key theme throughout
the text22' and constitutes one of the primary changes from
the 1988 version. Wood also emphasizes the fact that these new
Guidelines provide instruction on how to apply existing U.S. do-
mestic law in a non-discriminatory manner to international
transactions."=
Even though U.S. antitrust law has always been applied to
international commerce, the 1995 Guidelines enumerate signifi-
cant factors and related statutes for agencies to use when at-
tempting to identify anticompetitive behavior." Pertinent
statutes include, among others, the Sherman Act, the Clayton
Act, Title H of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act, and the National Cooperative Research and Production
Act.2" Operation of these statutes and other factors in certain
situations is illustrated in the Guidelines through a series of
hypotheticals that allow the agencies to analyze and check the
procedure to use in different contexts. 2
Other topics covered in the Guidelines include the Depart-
ment of Justice's and the FTC's subject matter jurisdiction over
actions occurring outside of the United States, issues of comity
and other factors that provide authority for jurisdiction, and
220. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMISSION, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, (Apr. 1995) [hereinafter
AEGIO].
221. Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations U.S. Deputy Assistant At-
torney General's Views, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,144, at 49,093, 49,096 (Apr. 11,
1995).
222. Id. at 49,095.
223. Justice and FTC Issue Final Guidelines on International Antitrust Enforce-
ment, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 68, at 462 (Apr. 6, 1995) [hereinafter
Justice and FTC].
224. AEGIO, supra note 220, §§ 2.1-2.5.
225. AEGIO, supra note 220.
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"the effects of foreign governmental involvement on the anti-
trust liability of private entities."226
The Guidelines also cite four major philosophical principles
that the Department of Justice and FTC would like an agency
to follow regarding enforcement of antitrust provisions:
1) Foreign commerce cases can involve almost any provision
of the antitrust laws;
2) The enforcement agencies do not discriminate in the en-
forcement of the antitrust laws on the basis of the nationality
of the parties;
3) The agencies do not use their antitrust authority to fur-
ther non-antitrust objectives; and
4) Once jurisdictional requirements, comity, and doctrines of
foreign governmental involvement have been considered and
satisfied, the substantive antitrust rules that apply to domestic
operations apply with equal force to international opera-
tions.227
C. Intellectual Property Guidelines
Concurrent with the release of the Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations, the Department of
Justice and the FTC also released the 1995 Antitrust Guide-
lines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property,2 which re-
place the intellectual property portions of the 1988 Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations .2' The
most significant feature of these Guidelines is the establish-
ment of "safety zones" for licensing agreements that collectively
total less than 21 percent of the relevant market affected by
the restraint.2 10 According to U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney
226. AEGIO, supra note 220, § 1.
227. Justice and FTC, supra note 223.
228. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST GUIDE-
LINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, (Apr. 1995).
229. 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property: U.S. Depu-
ty Assistant Attorney General's Views, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,145, at 49,099
(Apr. 11, 1995) [hereinafter Deputy Assistant Attorney General's Views].
230. Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1708, at 5-11 (Apr. 13, 1995).
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General Richard J. Gilbert, there are two factors that will be
considered to determine if an intellectual property arrangement
falls within the "safety zone."23'
The first factor is whether or not the restraint is facially
anticompetitive."2 Examples of facially anticompetitive behav-
ior include such things as price fixing and market division.2"
The second factor is whether "the licensor and its licensees
collectively account for no more than twenty percent of each rel-
evant market significantly affected by the restraint."' If the
agreement is deemed not to be facially anticompetitive and
collectively accounts for less the twenty-one percent of the mar-
ket, then it will probably fall within the established "safety
zone."2
IV. CIVIL ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF VIRGINIA
The Antitrust and Consumer Litigation Section of the Virgin-
ia Attorney General's Office reported that this past year it
settled a group boycott claim against a doctors' association in
Danville, Virginia.
The settlement, set out in a Consent Final Judgment, came
after the Virginia Attorney General's Office conducted a joint
investigation with the Federal Trade Commission into the prac-
tices of Physicians Group, Inc. (PGI), an association of physi-
cians located in Danville, Virginia."' In the Complaint, which
the Commonwealth filed simultaneously with the settlement,
the Commonwealth alleged that PGI and seven doctors who
comprise the former and current members of its board of direc-
tors, organized and carried out a group boycott in Danville of
Key Advantage, the state's managed health care plan for its
231. Deputy Assistant Attorney General's Views, supra note 229.
232. Id.
233. Id
234. Id-
235. Id.
236. Virginia v. Physicians Group, Civil Action No. 95-0015-D (W.D. Va. filed Apr.
26, 1995). The authors represented Physicians Group and certain members of its
board of directors in this matter.
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employees and their dependents."' The Commonwealth al-
leged that because of the boycott, there were not enough physi-
cians participating in the plan to adequately serve the medical
needs of the almost 2000 state employees in the Danville ar-
ea. 2 ' As a result, the Commonwealth alleged it had to imple-
ment an interim health insurance plan, which allowed these
employees and their dependents to see non-participating phy-
sicians in the area without financial penalty." The interim
plan was in place from October 1, 1992, when Key Advantage
was first implemented statewide, until July 1, 1994.2"
Although individual doctors and medical group practices may
independently decline to participate in insurance and managed
care health plans, the Commonwealth alleged that the joint
decision was a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
and the Virginia Antitrust Act.24' PGI and its board members
denied any liability and the parties settled the matter by
means of the Consent Final Judgment.
Additionally, an Agreement to Cease and Desist and Order
between the FTC and PGI has obtained preliminary approval
from the Commission, and has been published for public com-
ment.242 In settling the FTC's charges, PGI and its board
members likewise denied any wrongdoing.'
V. FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY
A. Federal Legislation
In November, 1994, President Clinton signed a bill that en-
acted the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act to
help the Department of Justice in obtaining antitrust evidence
located outside of the United States.24 The new law provides
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
438, 108 Stat. 4597 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6201-6212 (1995)).
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the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission with a
powerful new tool in obtaining evidence overseas for domestic
prosecutions,' 5 which may alleviate previous difficulties that
U.S. enforcement authorities have encountered in this area.2
The law also allows for investigations into possible violations of
foreign antitrust laws and the reciprocal exchange of evidence
and information with foreign antitrust authorities to determine
if a violation of a federal antitrust law or a foreign antitrust
law has occurred. 7
According to Section 12 of the Act, a foreign antitrust author-
ity is defined as a governmental body endorsed by a foreign
state or "regional economic integration organization" to enforce
the antitrust laws of that state or organization." The Act al-
lows for an exchange of information pursuant to an "antitrust
mutual assistance agreement." 9 Such agreements are essen-
tially a "written memorandum of understanding" between the
United States and the foreign antitrust authority for the pur-
poses of conducting an investigation into possible antitrust
violations." ° The requisite provisions of an antitrust mutual
assistance agreement include the following:
1) An assurance that each side will provide assistance compa-
rable in scope to that received by the other; m
2) An assurance that the foreign authority is subject to the
laws and procedures as promulgated by the United States re-
garding the confidentiality of antitrust evidence;"
3) A description of U.S laws as well as the laws of the for-
eign authority governing the confidentiality of antitrust evi-
24. I&
246. See, e.g., United States v. General Electric Co., 869 F. Supp. 1285 (S.D. Ohio
1994). Here, the court awarded G.E. a judgment of acquittal on charges that it violat-
ed § 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring with DeBeers Centenary Co. to raise prices
worldwide in the industrial diamond market. In this case, the Antitrust Division
stated that it had some difficulty obtaining certain evidence from overseas. Id. at
1300.
247. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act, § 3, 108 Stat. at 4597.
248. Id § 12, 108 Stat. at 4603.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. § 8, 108 Stat. at 4601.
252. Id. § 12(2)(B), 108 Stat. at 4603.
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dence as well as the enforcement mechanisms and penalties
applicable to such laws;253
4) Citations to the specific federal and foreign antitrust laws
to which the agreement applies;
5) Terms and conditions that permit the disclosure of anti-
trust evidence gathered in the course of the investigation and
any other factors pertaining to disclosure; 5
6) An assurance that any material/evidence given to the for-
eign authority will be returned to the Attorney General or Fed-
eral Trade Commission;... and
7) Terms and conditions for terminating the agreement.25
Use of antitrust mutual assistance agreements are condi-
tioned, however, on the determination by the Attorney General
or the Federal Trade Commission that the foreign authority will
in fact abide by the terms as outlined in the agreement and
that such an agreement is "consistent with the public interest
of the United States."25 They must also conclude that pro-
viding evidence to the foreign authority will not violate any
restrictions placed on the Attorney General or the Federal
Trade Commission under Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 9 vio-
late the interests of national defense or foreign policy, or fall
within one of the enumerated areas of disclosure prevented by
federal law.26
The Act also includes provisions for jurisdiction of U.S. dis-
trict courts,21 limitations on judicial review2 ' and publica-
tion of antitrust mutual assistance agreements in the Federal
Register."
253. Id. § 12(2)(C), 108 Stat. at 4603.
254. Id. § 12(2)(D), 108 Stat. at 4603.
255. Id. § 12(2)(E), 108 Stat. at 4603.
256. Id. § 12(2)(F), 108 Stat. at 4603.
257. Id. § 12(2)(G), 108 Stat. at 4603.
258. Id. §§ 8(a)(1)-(3), 108 Stat. at 4601.
259. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1989); International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act §
5, 108 Stat. at 4600.
260. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act § 5(2), 108 Stat. at 4600.
261. Id. § 4, 108 Stat. at 4599.
262. Id. § 9, 108 Stat. at 4602.
263. Id. § 7, 108 Stat. at 4600.
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B. Virginia State Legislation
The Virginia General Assembly did not pass any significant
antitrust legislation this past year.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the Virginia federal and state courts develop more experi-
ence in antitrust cases, they have become increasingly suspect
of such claims and have demonstrated a heightened willingness
to dispose of meritless claims as a matter of law. As with any
case, adherence to the rules of procedure and evidence is es-
sential to maintaining a viable claim and several antitrust
cases decided this year make this point clear. Federal enforce-
ment agencies issued the long-awaited International and In-
tellectual Property Guidelines and a new federal law was enact-
ed to help obtain evidence of international antitrust violations.
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